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B. J. George, Jr.*
The doctrine of jurisdiction-the authority of nations or states to create or
prescribe penal or regulatory norms and to enforce them through adminis-
trative and judicial action '-has been a source of difficulty in both inter-
national and domestic law for centuries. 2 The last two decades, however,
have witnessed more conflicts over the invocation of forum penal laws to
reach persons and activities outside national boundaries than had arisen
for more than a century before. Moreover, treaties restricting some dimen-
sions of penal jurisdiction based on other than the territorial concept have
become increasingly common, and some nations have legislated to prevent
their citizens or subjects from submitting to demands made by other coun-
tries exercising extraterritorial powers. 3 Before considering these develop-
ments and law reform measures arising from them, it may be helpful to
survey traditional international law principles affecting legislative and ad-
judicative jurisdiction 4 and relevant American state and federal precedent.
JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Traditionally, international law has recognized six alternative bases for
penal legislation: 5
(1)Territorial sovereignty. Each state may regulate conduct on or in the
air above its land and territorial waters. 6 An entire criminal transaction
need not occur within national territory, although a significant or substan-
tial part should. 7 This rests on the evident principle that the government
and people of a state are most likely to be concerned about and affected
by harmful acts committed within that state's boundaries. 8
(2) Registry of vessels and aircraft. According to what on occasion has
been called the "floating territory" principle, a ship or aircraft under the
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flag of a country 9 is within the sweep of domestic legislative power. 10 The
doctrine rests "on the pragmatic basis that there must be some law on
shipboard, that it cannot change at every change of waters, and no experi-
ence shows a better rule than that of the state that owns [the vessel]." 11
(3) Protected interest. 12 Nations may punish conduct outside their bor-
ders having or intended to have substantial harmful effect within their
boundaries 13 or directed against the security of the state or a governmental
function or interest. 14 Perpetrators need not be nationals of the prosecut-
ing state.
(4) Nationality of an offender. Countries can define and punish criminal
conduct of their nationals wherever the latter happen to be. 15 No other
nation can object except, possibly, on the basis of dual nationality. 16
(5) Nationality of victim, or "passive personality." States may endeavor
to extend their penal laws to include harmful acts committed by nonciti-
zens against their citizens wherever the latter may be. 17 This is a much
more debated principle than the others canvassed here. It was asserted in
The Lotus Case, before the Permanent Court of International Justice, 18 as a
basis for applying Turkish penal law against an officer of a French vessel
which caused a maritime disaster. The decision in the case, however, was
based on alternative theories of jurisdiction. 19
(6) Universality. The community of nations recognizes certain offenses
like piracy, 20 slave trading, 21, hijacking 22 and perhaps certain terrorist
acts 23 as matters of universal concern. Perpetrators of these offenses may
be prosecuted and punished under domestic penal legislation by whatever
nation apprehends them, whether or not such acts occur within the prose-
cuting nation's territory or affect its vessels, aircraft or nationals. 24 Geno-
cide also may rest within the principle under modem customary
international law. 25
American federal and state courts have considered and applied many of
these principles as a matter of constitutional law as well as statutory
interpretation, an issue to which I now turn.
AMERICAN FEDERAL AND STATE PRECEDENTS
Although over the decades most federal and state penal legislation has
rested on the territorial principle, some examples exist of the use of most
if not all of the principles recognized in international law.
Territorial Jurisdiction
While the exercise of territorial jurisdiction generally is uncontroversial,
certain special situations should be considered. By legislation, 26 federal
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maritime and territorial jurisdiction extends to the high seas 27 and other
waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
and not within the jurisdiction of any American state. 28 It also com-
prehends vessels of American ownership whenever they are within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, 29 and American
aircraft in flight over the high seas or any other waters within United States
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. 30
For the most part, federal legislative competence rests on delegated
substantive powers under the Constitution, 31 and not on locale. 32 In
considering the exercise of federal legislative competence against the back-
drop of international law, the Native American tribal cases are relevant, for
depending on the circumstances United States courts may consider Native
American tribes as separate sovereigns. 33 Tribes retain the power to en-
force tribal criminal laws against tribal members unless Congress abrogates
that power, 34 and also can invoke tribal laws against non-Indians on tribal
lands, but not on privately owned lands enclosed within a reservation. 35
States may acquire jurisdiction over Native American lands only with the
consent of an affected tribe, 36 but can be selective about the criminal
statutes they declare applicable to those lands. 37 State criminal jurisdiction
can be destroyed, however, if under the Major Crimes Act 38 an area within
a state meets the legislative definition of "Indian country," the crime is a
listed offense and the defendant is a Native American belonging to the
group by which the status of Indian country has been determined. 39
The consequence of these holdings is the same as if foreign nations
maintained enclaves on American soil, causing difficulties in determining
the extent to which federal and state law might govern those special
geographical areas. Only because Native American groups were on the
North American continent before Caucasians arrived and in the modem
era maintain no external relations with other nations does such a form of
extraterritoriality, which nations generally resist strongly, 40 continue to
receive a measure of judicial and congressional recognition.
State and local law of course is primarily based on territorial jurisdic-
tion. American states control their land and immediate coastal waters as
established through federal law. 41 Municipalities derive their legislative
powers from state constitutions and legislation, 42 but there is no federal
constitutional basis to object to the exercise of otherwise authorized
municipal powers over residents and activities in adjacent areas which
impact upon a legislating and enforcing municipality. 43 Consonant with
the federal law governing federal governmental enclaves, 44 states possess
concurrent legislative and judicial competence unless the federal govern-
ment has accepted a total relinquishment of state powers. 45
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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
More difficult issues arise with respect to prescription of rules applicable
to acts occurring beyond territorial jurisdiction. The federal constitution
does not restrict the exercise of penal legislative powers to the territorial
and floating territorial principles. Congress can base statutes on the protec-
tive or objective territorial principle, 46 citizenship of offenders 47 and per-
haps the passive personality concept. 48 The universality principle is
recognized in the constitutional grant of authority to Congress to define
and punish piracy and offenses against the law of nations, 49 as well as
through United States ratification of the Convention on the High Seas. 50
Activities thus declared criminals may be prosecuted even though offend-
ers never were present in the United States during a criminal transaction. 51
Federal jurisdiction has extended to the point where United States
courts have held that conspirators or accessories are criminally liable even
though not physically within the United States when an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy was committed in United States territory. 52
Commission of an overt act may satisfy the territorial principle even
though it may have been innocuous and not directly related to a constitu-
ent element of a crime. 53 Such applications of the territorial principle
approach so closely the protected interest principle that the requirement
of an overt act within the United States may be disappearing. 54
An ingrained judicial preference for the territorial principle is reflected,
however, in a rule that, unless the language of a criminal statute shows
clearly that Congress intended it to have extraterritorial effect, 55 there is
a presumption of exclusive domestic or internal application which can be
rebutted only through proof of a clear expression of congressional in-
tent. 56 United States v. Mitchell well illustrates the underlying judicial con-
cern over excessively broad exercise of federal legislative powers. There,
federal authorities invoked the Marine Mammal Protective Act 57 to en-
deavor to penalize the capture of dolphins outside American waters by a
United States citizen, resident in the Bahamas, who held a license to do so
from the Bahamian government. The Mitchell court held that, because of
the presumption against extraterritorial application, the act did not apply
to the defendant's activities.
A particular problem for the American federal government has been an
inability to try in American military courts service personnel who commit
nonmilitary offenses, 58 and accompanying civilian dependents 59 or civil-
ian employees of the armed forces 60 for offenses committed abroad. 61
Some of the latter cases might be tried in civilian courts, applying statutes
based on the protected interest principle. 62 It also is possible through a
treaty coupled with an enabling statute to create American civilian courts
in other countries, although it is difficult to administer them in peacetime
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because of the pervasive need to effectuate American constitutional safe-
guards governing criminal trials. 63
There is no constitutional obligation to establish special overseas courts
in lieu of surrendering for, or acquiescing in, trial of American service
personnel, employees or dependents before the courts of host nations. 64
Nor are the federal constitutional rights of service personnel violated
through their surrender in recognition of status-of-forces treaty obliga-
tions, 65 or even through their return by administrative action, before final
discharge, from the United States to a host country for trial. 66 After final
discharge, however, former military personnel cannot be recalled to active
duty for court-martial prosecution of offenses committed before dis-
charge. 67 This prohibition should embrace a return to active duty to facili-
tate an individual's surrender by administrative action to a foreign
government, an objective which ought to be achieved only through inter-
national extradition if an appropriate treaty exists between the United
States and the former host government. 68
The federal Constitution does not block state enactment of penal stat-
utes with extraterritorial application as long as their enforcement does not
conflict with the foreign relations of the United States 69 or impinge upon
the rights of other American states with concurrent jurisdiction. 70 Never-
theless, state courts traditionally have expressed hostility toward depar-
tures from exclusive reliance on the territorial principle unless part of a
criminal transaction occurs within state boundaries or waters. 71 There are,
however, examples of state reliance on citizenship or vessel registry, 72 and
of the protected interest concept, at least if there is an identifiable harm
sought or created within the forum state and the conduct was neither
permitted nor required where it took place. 73 In several states, nonethe-
less, revision of constitutional language restricting criminal trials to the
county or district in which crimes are perpetrated would be necessary
before a place of trial could be established for anticipatory crimes commit-
ted entirely within another state or nation. 74
JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS AND THEIR RESOLUTION
United States and Other Nations
Three patterns of conflict between the United States and one or more other
nations, arising from the enforcement of or adjudications under criminal
legislation with extraterritorial effect, have surfaced through the years.
One arises from dual nationality when the United States demands a course
of conduct of its citizens and another nation exacts a conflicting re-
sponse. 75 This occurred, for example, before and during World War II
when Japanese-American citizens in Japan were required, as Japanese sub-
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jects, to engage in activities which American authorities later viewed as
treasonable. 76 Because former enemy nations were not in a position to
object effectively, these matters were disposed of as issues of domestic law
rather than through diplomatic negotiations.
A second has been occasioned when persons commit crimes on Ameri-
can vessels within the territorial waters of another country. American
doctrine asserts exclusive power if a ship's discipline is affected, but ac-
cepts concurrent authority if a criminal act "involve[s] the peace or dignity
of the country or the tranquility of the port." 77 Conflicts of this sort have
been resolved through diplomatic negotiations. 78
A third arises from efforts to extend American economic and regulatory
legislation to activities within other countries, a matter covered below. 79
In passing, one should note that the traditional law of self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment does not recognize a claim of privilege because
responses may incriminate under the laws of another nation. Some deci-
sions 80 recognize potential unfairness in the traditional doctrine but al-
most without exception have avoided deciding the matter because the
possibility in a particular proceeding of incrimination under the laws of
another legal system has not been established to the court's satisfaction. 81
American States and Other Nations
Should an American state assert extraterritorial legislative and adjudicative
powers in the face of a specific, legitimate protest from another affected
nation, it would violate the United States Constitution. 82 Federal courts
would intervene in such an instance, provided the conflict were actual and
asserted by a foreign nation. An abstract or hypothetical conflict would not
suffice. 83 If, by treaty, nationals of another country are accorded certain
freedoms while in the United States, no American state or municipality can
punish or otherwise impose sanctions on the exercise of such treaty
rights. 84
American States and the Federal Government
In addition to problems of concurrent territorial jurisdiction, already men-
tioned, 85 conflict of subject-matter competence can arise if a state legis-
lates inconsistently with national statutes based on a power delegated to
Congress under the Constitution. 86 According to the "occupation of the
field" doctrine, the conflicting state law is unconstitutional. 87 This might
very well prove the case should state economic legislation bearing residual
criminal penalties extend to international commerce or finance.
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States Among Themselves
Because-under the double jeopardy clause, 88 for example-states are
considered separate sovereigns, the interstate conflicts cases are a mi-
crocosm of international law conflicts. If legislative competence is invoked
solely according to the territorial principle, exercise of judicial competence
can result in multiple prosecutions of individual offenders only if criminal
transactions extend across state lines. 89 Interstate conflicts also could
occur should a state punish acts of its citizens committed in another juris-
diction, but they are exceedingly rare and treated hostilely by American
state courts when they occur. 90
More direct conflict can arise if states use the protected interest or
passive personality principle to reach activities of persons never physically
present or legal entities not conducting business within a prosecuting state
at the time of that activity. Penal legislation thus based is valid only if the
activity is punishable in both jurisdictions. 91 Otherwise, conduct innocent
where performed might be punished in a state with which a defendant has
no direct contact. 92
Interstate compacts often confer concurrent "jurisdiction" over rivers
and lakes through which state boundary lines run, designed to ensure at
least one prosecution if it cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt
exactly where on a body of water an offense was committed. It is unconsti-
tutional, however, for State A to extend its penal or regulatory legislation
over waters clearly within the territory of State B, particularly in an effort
to control otherwise lawful or permitted activities by citizens of State
B. 93 This, too, constitutes a domestic application of principles familiar
under the international law governing high seas and territorial waters. 94
Personal Jurisdiction Unaffected by Jurisdictional Defects
Whatever defects there may be in the invocation of standards governing
exercise of legislative competence, individual defendants cannot benefit
unless as a matter of forum constitutional law a statute is invalidated on
its face. 95 That of course destroys the power of a court to enter a binding
judgment. 96 If, however, a forum state rules that its penal legislation is
valid and adjudicates accordingly, the fact that another nation can protest
invocation of that legislation against its nationals or with reference to
activities occurring within its boundaries has no impact on forum jurisdic-
tion. That, at any rate, is the conclusion drawn from the generally-recog-
nized rule that unlawful arrest, detention or return in defiance of
extradition treaty law does not impair a court's power to adjudicate the
criminality of one physically before it. 97
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ENFORCEMENT OF PENAL ADJUDICATIONS:
THE PRISONER TREATIES
An interesting analog to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction has
arisen recently under the prisoner exchange treaties between the United
States and several other countries. 98 Under these treaties, the United
States has agreed to enforce foreign sentences against American citizens
based on acts committed abroad, often beyond the reach of United States
jurisdiction.
According to venerable dictum, no nation is to enforce the penal laws
or adjudications of another country. 99 Hence, in the absence of treaty or
authorizing legislation, a person convicted of a crime and sentenced to
imprisonment in one jurisdiction cannot be confined in the prisons of
another. 100 A consequence in the modem era has been that many Ameri-
cans, often young persons transporting or in possession of controlled sub-
stances, have been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to lengthy terms
of imprisonment under conditions of incarceration viewed as inhumane
according to American standards. The federal government has responded
by executing several bilateral treaties allowing transfers of prisoners, na-
tionals of one of the signatory nations, from the nation of imprisonment
to the nation of citizenship for purposes of service of sentence. 101
Under these treaties and implementing federal legislation, 102 incar-
cerated American citizens 103 may apply for transfer to federal custody and
may be accepted if both the United States and the country in which a penal
conviction 104 was entered consent. Before transfer, a prisoner must agree
not to attack directly or collaterally the validity of the underlying convic-
tion itself except in the courts of the nation in which it was entered. 105
A United States magistrate or a citizen specifically commissioned for the
purpose by a federal judge must verify a prisoner's consent before trans-
fer. 106 After transfer, a prisoner can challenge the legality of transfer, but
not the validity of the underlying conviction, in the federal district court
within the jurisdiction of which he or she is incarcerated or under super-
vision. 107 Prisoners on probation are transferable if a federal district court
is willing to supervise probation within this country. 108 Those accepted
in American prisons receive credit for time served 109 before transfer and
the usual good time credits after, 110 and may be paroled. 111
American federal and state courts are barred from detaining, prosecut-
ing, trying or sentencing a transferred prisoner for the same offense on
which the foreign conviction is based, 112 and only those deprivations of
civil, political or civic rights or other disqualifications may be imposed
which would have flowed from an American conviction for the same
offense. 113 Sentences imposing an obligation to make restitution or repa-
rations are enforcible as if they were civil judgments rendered by a federal
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district court. 114 If transfer proceedings are ruled invalid or if the tranfer-
ring nation wishes the prisoner returned on another matter after comple-
tion of service of sentence, the statute provides for retransfer of custody
to the country in which the original criminal judgment was entered. 115
American citizens returned to the United States under the treaty with
Mexico began immediate efforts to obtain release from prison through
habeas corpus on federal constitutional grounds. 116 Ultimately, however,
the Ninth Circuit in Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons 117 and the Second
Circuit in Rosado v. Civiletti 118 sustained the constitutionality of the prisoner
transfer system.
Both courts agreed that the test to determine the validity of prisoner
consents to transfer should be drawn from that governing guilty pleas in
criminal cases, 119 and not from that according to which waivers of fourth
amendment rights through consent to search are evaluated. 120 The differ-
ence is significant. Pleas of guilty are valid even though defendants are
motivated by a desire to avoid harsher sanctions which will be imposed
if they are tried and convicted, 121 provided they are counseled, have
knowledge of the elements of the charge 122 and the consequences of
submitting a guilty plea, and voluntarily elect a guilty plea as the best of
an array of unpleasant alternatives. Consents to search, in contrast, must
be free from any element of coercion or pressure other than the fact that
officials request waiver. Both courts of appeals thought that prisoners with
American nationality need only know that, under a treaty and federal law,
incarceration, probation or parole close to home, in a familiar environment
using a familiar language, is available as an alternative to incarceration in
an alien environment. Because the statute provides procedural safeguards
not dissimilar to those governing guilty pleas, 123 consents to transfer in
compliance with it are lawful.
The Rosado court went beyond the mere fact of consent to consider
whether American constitutional concepts of procedural due process and
protections against harsh and inhumane punishment governed the return
of American nationals from other countries where they had been convicted
without like guarantees. The court thought no difficulty lurked in the fact
that a Mexican judgment of conviction underlay execution of penalties in
the federal prison, parole and probation system, because the treaty created
mutual obligations on each signatory nation to receive and control prison-
ers adjudicated in the other. 124
The Second Circuit clearly believed that the American petitioners
before it had been convicted in the course of proceedings which fell far
short of American concepts of due process and had been incarcerated in
Mexico under unacceptably inhumane conditions. Nevertheless, the fun-
damental issue was whether the agreements executed by the petitioners
not to attack their convictions directly or indirectly other than before
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Mexican courts were invalid on federal constitutional grounds. The court
thought they were not. Had the petitioners, while Mexican prisoners,
refused to accept that condition, neither Mexico nor the United States
would have consented to a transfer. Petitioners made a voluntary choice
among available alternatives and the condition restricting the forum in
which they might contest the original penal adjudication was neither need-
less nor arbitrary. The treaty exchange mechanism serves the interests of
the United States in having its own nationals incarcerated or supervised
within its own system. The treaty also protects the interests of American
citizens who are or might be imprisoned abroad. Should the treaty be
invalidated or the petitioners released, the hopes of these other citizens
would be frustrated and they would have no alternative to service of
sentence in a harsh environment. 125 That the court would not allow.
Pfeifer added two further dimensions. The petitioner there asserted that
the mandated agreement not to attack the underlying judgment of convic-
tion was an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of a constitutional
right. That doctrine, however, extends only to limitations on vested consti-
tutional rights 126 and has no application to a condition which merely
confirms the situation which would exist in the absence of the treaty,
namely, that criminal judgments can be attacked only in the courts of the
nation which entered them. 127 Pfeifer also urged that the treaty meant the
United States would be participating in a joint venture with Mexican
authorities by accepting and incarcerating their American prisoners, thus
encouraging Mexico to arrest, charge and adjudicate other Americans
guilty of Mexican crimes. The court, however, did not perceive the holding
of its cases on cooperative police investigations 128 as extending to the
prisoner treaty setting.
Having survived the scrutiny of the Rosado and Pfeifer courts, the prisoner
exchange treaties probably will withstand further constitutional chal-
lenges. Under them, the United States can enforce the criminal judgments
of foreign courts whenever a treaty implemented by the federal statute




Hovering and the Smuggling of Controlled Substances
Over a span of approximately two generations the United States has been
particularly concerned with enforcing its laws on smuggling and controlled
substances. 129 So-called hovering vessels or "mother ships" 130 encoun-
tered outside United States waters 131 have created a series of jurisdictional
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and constitutional problems as the United States has sought to enforce
these laws against the crews of hovering vessels.
The first statute directed at such vessels, the Anti-Smuggling Act of
1935, 132 was designed to forestall evasion of federal taxes on alcoholic
beverages which could be imported following repeal of the eighteenth
amendment. 133 It authorizes the President to declare offshore waters a
"customs-enforcement area" within a maximum radius of one hundred
nautical miles from the United States coast. It further authorizes hovering
vessels to be boarded within an additional zone of fifty nautical miles. Five
such zones were created shortly after enactment and apparently remain in
existence. 134
Related to this are two other statutes. First, United States Coast Guard
personnel may carry out inquiries, examinations, searches, seizures and
arrests upon the high seas and waters to prevent, detect and suppress
federal criminal violations. 135 Second, both Customs and Coast Guard
personnel may board vessels anywhere within customs waters 136 to exam-
ine ship's documents and inspect vessels and contents in connection with
the enforcement of federal customs laws. 137
A final dimension of the matter stems from provisions of the multilater-
al Convention on the High Seas to which the United States is a party. 138
Article 22 allows warships to intercept and board foreign merchant vessels
on the high seas on three bases only: (1) reasonable grounds to suspect a
ship is engaged in piracy; (2) reasonable grounds to suspect slave trading;
or (3) a reasonable basis to believe a vessel flying a different flag in reality
has the same nationality as the intercepting warship. 139 If none of these
grounds exists and there is no special treaty affecting powers of warships
of one nation to inspect merchant vessels of another, ships can be boarded
only from warships of the same nationality. 140
These provisions have been the object of substantial litigation within
the past few years because United States Coast Guard and Customs Service
personnel have boarded vessels on the high seas and in territorial waters,
discovered evidence of criminal activity (usually controlled substances)
and prosecuted those responsible. The defendants have asserted that their
fourth amendment or other federal constitutional rights were violated so
that the evidence against them must be suppressed. 141
A first concern has been the factual, and particularly subjective, basis
which boarding personnel must establish to legitimate a vessel intercep-
tion. Safety and similar inspections may be carried out against known
American registry vessels without a need for suspicion of noncompliance
or wrongdoing. 142 Under all other circumstances, however, intercepting
personnel must have a reasonable basis to suspect either United States
vessel registry or nationality 143 or the violation of one or more federal
criminal statutes. 144 For fourth amendment purposes, the stop-and-frisk
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doctrine may be used by analogy if there is a reasonable basis to suspect
that the crew of a vessel, whatever its registry, is engaged in violating
federal law. 145
United States v. Postal 146 illustrates the application of these principles. The
first boarding of the vessel in Postal occurred within United States territorial
waters and was based on a reasonable suspicion that the ship, which bore
no name and which belatedly displayed what was claimed to be a Grand
Bahamian flag, actually was of United States nationality. Therefore, the
interception met federal statutory requirements and did not violate the
Convention on the High Seas. 147 On inspection, the vessel in fact was
determined not to be of United States registry or nationality. 148 Thereaf-
ter, a second boarding of the same vessel took place in international waters
which could not be justified under either federal statutes or article 22 of
the Convention. American officials already knew the vessel to be of foreign
nationality and had no belief it was engaged in piracy or slave trading.
Hence, boarding the vessel violated article 6 of the Convention. 149
If boarding activities are unlawful, the most important practical as well
as legal issue to be resolved by courts is that of sanctions. The Postal opinion
is significant on this issue. The defendants argued that because the board-
ing of the vessel violated a treaty to which the United States was a party,
that treaty directly required suppression of the evidence. Their argument
relied on Cook v. United States, 15 0 in which the Supreme Court had ruled that
a violation of a treaty between Great Britain and the United States pre-
vented the forfeiture of a smuggler's vessel because the treaty was self-
executing. The Postal bench, however, viewed article 6 of the high seas
convention not to be self-executing, so that there was no ground generated
by the treaty itself to suppress the evidence. That issue aside, by analogy
to the Ker doctrine, 151 the court concluded that it could not justify sup-
pression of evidence solely because principles of international law or non-
self-executing treaty provisions might have been contravened by federal
authorities. To this might be added the principle that individuals do not
benefit directly from international law standards. 152 In illustration, United
States v. Williams 153 noted that because Panama had authorized United
States officials to board a ship of Panamanian nationality, its consent
bound the defendants and destroyed any legal basis for them to object to
an ensuing search and seizure. 154
Obviously, difficult problems of federal constitutional and international
law are posed by anti-smuggling, customs and controlled substances laws
extending into international as well as territorial waters and by actions of
American federal officials to enforce them. Ultimately, the United States
Supreme Court should consider and resolve them. In the interim, however,
the growing body of Fifth Circuit law provides an adequate theoretical
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basis for vessel interceptions and searches, and a sufficient practical guide
for federal officials.
Antitrust Law Enforcement
The federal courts have been less successful in managing extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act, which extends to restraint of trade or
commerce "among the several States, or with foreign nations." 155 To the
extent criminal prosecutions 156 are based on activities in restraint of trade
by any person or entity, even of foreign nationality, within United States
territory or on conduct by United States nationals or entities taking place
outside United States territory directly affecting foreign commerce, there
should be no basis in international law for objection on the part of any
other nation, including one in which an American individual or company
has acted. 157 The United States government, however, has asserted over
the years that its legislative competence extends, under a form of the
protected interest (or, as some prefer, "objective territorial") principle, to
activity by non-nationals outside American territory which has conse-
quences within American boundaries. 158 This theory of jurisdiction is
sometimes called the "effects doctrine." 159 If conduct is intended to and
actually does have an impact on United States imports or exports, federal
law can be invoked even though the responsible persons or entities owe
no allegience to the United States. 160
Whether the effects doctrine indeed should be acknowledged as cogniz-
able under customary international law is hotly debated. 161 Some federal
precedent adds qualifiers: the impact must be adverse and substantial and
"the interests of, and links to, the United States-including the magnitude
of the effect on American foreign commerce-[must be] sufficiently strong
vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial
authority." 162 If these concerns are met, there is both legislative and
judicial competence; if not, proceedings ought not lie.
Even though there may be an arguable basis for allowing an assertion
of judicial competence over extraterritorial activities, the court in Timberlane
Lumber believed there ought to be a "jurisdictional rule of reason" allowing
a judicial order of forbearance in the interests of comity and fairness. 163
The elements to be weighed include
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegience
of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corpora-
tions, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States
as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit
purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
16 TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 164
Although reasonable from an American perspective, this device to con-
trol over-zealous invocation of the effects doctrine is hardly satisfactory
from the standpoint of the government of another nation. Determinations
whether or not legislative competence will be recognized are for the courts
after the fact, and a foreign government may well assume that no exercise
of jurisdiction over acts performed within its geographical area is permissi-
ble under principles of international law. 165 Nonetheless, that is the posi-
tion to which United States authorities generally have adhered. 166
The United Kingdom has been adamant in its refusal to leave the basic
decision concerning power to adjudicate extraterritorial antitrust and other
matters to any foreign judiciary. Hence, the United Kingdom Parliament
enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act. 167 Under its provisions,
the United Kingdom Secretary of State may take certain steps if he deter-
mines that actions under the laws of another nation affecting international
trade, resting on acts done outside the territorial jurisdiction of that nation,
affect persons conducting business in the United Kingdom. One step is to
require those conducting business in the United Kingdom to notify the
Secretary of State about requirements or prohibitions imposed or threat-
ened to be imposed in accordance with the laws of another nation. 168 A
second is to issue directives prohibiting compliance to whatever extent the
Secretary desires, if compliance may result in damage to United Kingdom
trading interests. 169 An order prohibiting compliance serves as a basis for
invocation of the act of state doctrine by the recipient against sanctions
based on noncompliance. 170
Under section 2 of the Act, the Secretary may direct persons within the
United Kingdom, whether or not they are citizens, to refuse to comply with
process or other mandates from another nation to produce commercial
documents or information located outside the territory of the mandating
nation, if the demand infringes upon United Kingdom jurisdiction, or
otherwise prejudices its sovereignty, national security or United Kingdom
relationships with any other nation. 171 Secretarial order also can block
compliance with process or other requests or demands not connected with
an existing civil or criminal action in the requesting nation, or asking for
unspecified documents. 172
The principal immediate impact of the Act on American federal anti-
trust criminal investigations and prosecutions will be to frustrate federal
grand jury process directed at production of corporate and financial records
located in the United Kingdom, unless the United Kingdom Secretary of
State chooses to cooperate. Other nations, with or without equivalent
legislation, share the United Kingdom response to American prosecutorial
JURISDICTION 17
use of the effects doctrine. 173 Federal authorities, therefore, might do well,
in an effort to promote harmonious economic relations with other coun-
tries, to abandon reliance on the effects doctrine and accept the British
view as orthodox under contemporary international law. Nonetheless,
American doctrine as embodied in the pending Restatement Revised 174 ad-
heres to a somewhat broader view as structured in federal precedent. This
signals an indefinite time of international conflicts over United States
enforcement of economic regulatory legislation.
Securities Regulation
Similar problems of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction are present in the
field of securities regulations. As in the antitrust field, although most
federal decisions have been rendered in civil matters, criminal sanctions are
provided and the federal law draws no substantive distinctions between
civil and criminal coverage. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 175 penal-
izes fraudulent activities affecting the domestic securities market through
"any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly." 176 The
law also provides that federal securities law is not to apply to transactions
outside the jurisdiction of the United States unless they contravene SEC
rules and regulations governing them. 177 No such regulations have ever
been issued. That might have been taken by federal courts as a basis for
refusing extraterritorial application of federal securities law, yet the courts
have given the statute extraterritorial effect if necessary to safeguard
American securities markets and if there are sufficient minimum contacts
to bring a transaction within the definition of interstate commerce. 178
Under the jurisdictional theories embraced in federal precedent, criminal
prosecutions might be brought based on activities of non-United States
citizens or entities outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
There is of course no difficulty in prosecuting proprietors of fraudulent
schemes hatched within the United States to defraud investors in other
countries through advertisements in their own countries enticing them to
invest in an American enterprise. 179 One may assume as well a basis to
reach overseas activities by nationals or non-nationals to defraud Ameri-
can investors in American securities markets, as long as the statutory
requirements are met. 180 American authorities, however, ought not use a
sweeping effects or subject-matter doctrine to reach activities abroad
which affect securities transactions only outside the United States, even
though American nationals or ownership interests in an American enter-
prise are involved in a transaction. These matters can be left to prosecuting
authorities in the nation where the principal activities were based. 181 If
they are not, the same adverse governmental reactions and retaliatory
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legislation may be expected as has been experienced in the setting of
extraterritorial invocations of federal antitrust law. 182
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE PROPOSALS
AFFECTING JURISDICTION
As the discussion above suggests, federal law regarding jurisdiction has
developed in a somewhat uneven and occasionally objectionable fashion,
as courts have responded to the exigencies of various situations. A compre-
hensive revision of the federal criminal laws could and should reform
federal doctrine governing criminal jurisdiction. Such a revision has been
under study since 1966 when Congress established a National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. 183 The 1971 Commission report 184
eventuated in a series of Senate and House bills 185 extending down to the
present congressional session. 186 None has been enacted to date, but one
may assume that at some time within the decade Congress will legislate
some form of a comprehensive federal criminal code to replace the existing,
nearly two-century old accretion of federal penal statutes. Almost certain-
ly, a new code will contain jurisdictional provisions similar to if not identi-
cal with those in current legislative proposals.
The originally proposed draft included not only a provision governing
jurisdiction over offenses within the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States, 187 but also special provisions governing ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction. 188 Over the following decade, a considerable
refinement of these provisions has occurred. During the 96th and the
present 97th Congresses, however, the two houses have adhered to com-
peting formulations of jurisdictional doctrine to such an extent that there
appears a strong likelihood that one of them ultimately will appear in an
enacted code after a conference committee has done its work.
One procedural difficulty at the international level has been engendered
by including jurisdictional elements in the primary definition of specific
crimes. Under some extradition treaties the principle of mutuality means
that the penal laws of both contracting nations must define sanctioned
criminal conduct identically. If federal law contains a jurisdictional ele-
ment which a counterpart statute in an asylum nation does not, there is
a risk that authorities in the latter will deny extradition on grounds of lack
of mutuality. 189 This concern has been accommodated by making jurisdic-
tional factors the subject of separate subdivisions within sections of the
proposed code, apart from subsections defining crimes and establishing
sanctions for them. 190
A second, albeit domestic, problem is allocation of responsibility to
determine the existence of jurisdictional elements. The position of the
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Senate Judiciary Committee has been that the matter of jurisdiction should
be for the court and not the jury. 191 The House Judiciary Committee, in
contrast, has never agreed to that approach, and the bills in the two houses
since 1980 have continued to differ over whether determination of juris-
dictional issues should be left to the trier of fact on the primary criminal
charges or to the court as a matter of law. 192
In many respects, the coverage of the House and Senate bills is substan-
tially the same. The most basic concept is that of the "general jurisdiction
of the United States if [an] offense is committed within the United
States." 193 Next comes a three-pronged test of "special jurisdiction": 194
(1) Special territorial jurisdiction. Both proposals are substantially congruent
in their coverage of real property reserved or acquired for federal use over
which federal authorities have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, 195
unorganized territories or possessions of the United States, 196 certain is-
lands, rocks or keys 197 and offshore platforms on the outer continental
shelf. 198 There is a slight difference in technique in delineating jurisdiction
over Native American tribal groups and members. 199 The Senate version
would govern the underlying problem in the setting of United States Code
provisions governing Indian matters, 200 with only a cross-reference in the
special territorial jurisdiction setting, 201 while the House prefers resolu-
tion of the matter within the Federal Criminal Code itself. 202 Both, how-
ever, retain the existing territorial jurisdictional doctrines, while expanding
somewhat the list of offenses over which federal criminal jurisdiction is
retained. 203
(2) Special maritime jurisdiction. The two versions are intended to preserve
existing jurisdictional concepts 204 and therefore differ only slightly in
their language. 205 Both drafts preserve existing coverage of vessels within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States but outside
the jurisdiction of any state, if they belong to the United States, a state or
a locality, 206 a citizen of the United States or a corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States or one of its states. 207
(3) Special aircraft jurisdiction. The two drafts carry identical provisions
covering aircraft which consolidate scattered provisions of existing law. 208
Five circumstances qualify aircraft in flight 209 as within the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States: 210 (a) Aircraft owned by the United
States, a state, a locality, or an organization created by or under the laws
of the United States or a state; 211 (b) civil aircraft as defined by federal
statute; 212 (c) any other aircraft within the United States; 213 (d) any other
aircraft outside the United States that has its next scheduled destination
or last point of departure in the United States and next lands in the United
States, or which has an offense committed abroad it as defined in the
anti-hijacking convention 214 and lands in the United States with an al-
leged offender still on board; 215 (e) any other aircraft leased without crew
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to a lessee with a principal place of business in the United States or, if it
has no principal place of business, whose permanent residence is in the
United States. 216
The Senate bill covers basic principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction
through a single comprehensive section, 217 although in any specific in-
stance it is necessary to examine the jurisdictional subsection following the
definitional elements of an offense for special applications. Unless other-
wise expressly provided in statute, treaty or international agreement, ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction would extend over offenses committed outside
either the general 218 or special 219 jurisdiction of the United States only in
eleven situations.
The first is when the victim or intended victim of a crime of violence 220
is directed against a United States official, 221 a federal public servant 222
outside the United States in the performance of official duties, or a national
or an invitee of a national of the United States on the premises of a United
States embassy or consulate. 223 The first two possibilities rest on the
passive personality principle, 224 while the latter is an established special
dimension of the territorial principle. 225
The next three categories 226 cover treason 227 and sabotage; 228 various
offenses of counterfeiting, perjury, false swearing, bribery, fraud, imper-
sonation and obstruction of federal government functions committed by
a national or resident of the United States; 229 and controlled substances
offenses aimed at importing or ultimate sale or distribution within the
United States. 230 All rest on the protected interest or objective territorial
principle 231 coupled, in the instance of obstruction or impairment of fed-
eral government functions by a United States national or resident, with
nationality of an offender. 232
A fifth category, also resting on the protective principle, comprehends
offenses based on entry of persons or property into the United States. ?33
A sixth governs possession of explosives in a building owned by or under
the care, custody or control of the United States. 234 Although this might
well be within the concept of the special territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, 235 it is specified in order to eliminate all doubt about the
propriety of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 236
A seventh covers participation by persons outside the United States in
the commission of an offense which causes or threatens harm as defined
in a criminal statute, either within the United States or outside the United
States, to a citizen, national or resident of the United States, an organiza-
tion established under the laws of an American state or having its principal
place of business within the United States, or the United States itself. 237
Jurisdiction under this provision is based on a combination of the territorial
principle, 238 the passive personality theory and the protected interest
principle.
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The proposed statute lacks any restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction-
al powers under the seventh category. This seems questionable in light of
the serious adverse impact which unrestrained extraterritorial jurisdiction
can have on United States international relations. Any restraints on the
sweep of this provision would have to be accomplished through a judicial
continuation of existing doctrine requiring a substantial federal interest in
exercising jurisdiction. 239
The eighth category is related to the seventh, in that it covers activity
outside the general or special jurisdiction of the United States constituting
an attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit a federal crime within the
United States. 240 This rests, of course, on the territorial and protected
interest principles.
The ninth consists of two branches. 241 The first covers offenses by
federal public servants 242 (other than persons in the armed forces subject
to court-martial jurisdiction for their crimes at the time charges are laid).
The second covers members of federal public servants' households residing
abroad because of such public servants' official duties, or persons accom-
panying the military forces of the United States. 243 This is intended to
overcome the difficulties generated by Supreme Court decisions limiting
court-martial jurisdiction over civilian employees and dependents 244 by
giving federal district courts the competence to try such cases. 245
A tenth covers offenses committed either by or against a United States
national at a place outside the jurisdiction of any nation. 246 This might
give authority to prosecute for crimes in Antarctica, on a space station or
the moon or a habitable planet should space exploration move so far. 247
The provision rests on nationality of perpetrator or victim, as the case
might be, although the analogy to the historical floating territory con-
cept 248 is evident as well.
A final category covers offenses provided for in treaties or other interna-
tional agreements to which the United States is a party, requiring this
country to provide for federal jurisdiction over such offenses. 249 Illustra-
tions include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents 250 and the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terror-
ism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that
Are of International Significance. 251
The House bill, consonant with its policy of leaving jurisdictional issues
for resolution by triers of fact, 252 takes a different approach from that in
the Senate proposal. Individual sections indicate when they are to have
extraterritorial effect, 253 so that coverage in the general part is comple-
mentary only. Unless otherwise provided by law or treaty or other interna-
tional agreement, extraterritorial jurisdiction exists outside the general and
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special jurisdiction of the United States if any one of four alternatives 254
can be complied with.
The first, after restating the general premise of the bill that extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction must be specified in the description of an offense,
confirms that attempt or conspiracy criminality lies if the intended offense
would have fallen within extraterritorial legislative coverage had it been
consummated. 255 The second, which is the exact counterpart of a Senate
provision, 256 covers offenses committed by or against United States na-
tionals at a place outside the jurisdiction of any nation. 257 A third, identi-
cal to the Senate's proposal, 258 would create federal district court
jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by federal public servants not
subject to court-martial jurisdiction, members of federal public servants'
households residing abroad because of public servants' official duties, and
persons accompanying United States military forces. 259
The fourth alternative, similar to the Senate version, 260 covers attempts
or conspiracies to commit federal offenses within the United States, or
participation from outside the United States in a criminal transaction oc-
curring in whole or in part within the United States. 261 The important
difference between the two approaches is that the House version requires
a federal court to determine that there is a substantial federal interest in
a criminal investigation or prosecution before federal extraterritorial juris-
diction attaches, while the Senate bill does not. 262 Assuming an unwilling-
ness to relinquish entirely such an open-ended invitation for conflict with
other nations, 263 the House language is preferable because it adopts a rule
of substantiality as an expression of legislative policy.
One may hope that Congress soon will move more swiftly than it has
over the past decade in enacting a new federal criminal code. The jurisdic-
tional provisions of either the House or the Senate version are superior to
the present rather cursory legislation. Because, in the author's thinking,
highly technical issues of jurisdiction should not be left to jury resolution,
but rather should be decided, preferably before trial, through a reasoned
judicial decision subject if necessary to interlocutory appellate review, the
Senate version appears best. But either version or a compromise bill will
give more congressional guidance to the federal judiciary than it now
receives.
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
RESTATEMENT REVISED (1981)
The American Law Institute embarked in 1980 on a version of its 1965
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, and in 1981 and
1982 considered certain provisions relating to jurisdiction. 264 Revision of
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the Restatement is an important event because, in the absence of controlling
legislation, the Restatement is likely to guide judicial attitudes toward juris-
diction.
The revision differs significantly from the 1965 version in its use of a
three-fold classification of: (a) jurisdiction to prescribe-to subject to law,
whether by legislation, executive acts or orders, administrative rules or
regulations, or court judgments, the conduct, relations or status of persons
or the interests of persons in things; 265 (b) jurisdiction to adjudicate-to
subject persons or things to the process of courts or administrative tribu-
nals; 266 and (c) jurisdiction to enforce-to exercise authority to compel,
induce or reward compliance or impose sanctions for noncompliance. 267
Under the revised Restatement draft, jurisdiction to prescribe embraces
conduct occurring substantially within a state's territory; 268 the status of
persons or interests in things present there; 269 conduct outside its territory
having or intended to have substantial effect within its territory; 270 con-
duct, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside its territory; 271
conduct outside its territory by non-nationals directed against the security
of the state or certain state interests; 272 and certain forms of criminal
conduct of universal concern. 273
Because legislative jurisdiction exercised on some of these bases may
create conflicts with the laws of other nations, the Restatement Revised adopts
a basic limitation, logically directed at adjudicating entities, that a state
should not unreasonably 274 apply its law to conduct, relations, status or
interests of persons or things having connections with another state or
other states. 275 Certain criteria are set forth by which excessiveness can
be determined. 276
The Restatement Revised also gives special guidance on certain matters of
peculiar concern to modern American law. Legislative competence is
confirmed on antitrust matters if: (a) agreements in restraint of United
States trade are made in the United States and carried out predominantly
here, without regard to the nationality or places of business of the agreeing
parties or participants in conduct; (b) agreements in restraint are made
outside the United States and conduct or agreements in restraint of United
States trade are carried out predominantly outside the United States, if a
principal purpose of the conduct or agreement is to interfere with com-
merce of the United States and there is some effect on it; or (c) agreement
or conduct in restraint of United States trade has substantial effect on the
commerce of the United States and exercise of jurisdiction is not unreason-
able under section 403(2) and (3). 277
Jurisdiction over securities transactions can be asserted if they are car-
ried out or are intended to be carried out 278 on a securities market in the
United States, no matter what the nationality or place of business of
participants in the transaction or the issuer of the securities. 279 Transac-
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tions not on an American securities market may be regulated if: (a) securi-
ties of the same issue are traded on an American securities market; (b)
representations are made or negotiations conducted in the United States
concerning the transactions; or (c) the regulated party is a United States
national or resident or those sought to be protected 280 are United States
residents. 281
The rule of reasonableness under section 403(2), however, governs all
these applications, 282 as well as jurisdiction to adjudicate 283 and jurisdic-
tion to enforce. 284 Reasonableness is determined in light of factors well
documented in American and international law. 285
Two provisions relate solely to criminal adjudications. One restates the
traditional doctrine that courts within the United States adjudicate viola-
tions only of domestic criminal laws, not the penal laws of a foreign
nation. 2 86 This, of course, has no impact on the exercise of domestic penal
statutes punishing universal crimes or other nonterritorial offenses falling
within a nation's competence to legislate. 287 A second is that criminal
defendants must be personally present before a court in the United States
can adjudicate a case, 288 although it should be kept in mind that the
underlying constitutional rights to presence and confrontation are subject
to valid waiver. 289
CONCLUSION
In a simpler era there was little need to consider problems of the reach of
criminal legislation beyond a nation's borders, other than as it governed
vessels of national registry. Today, with the United States a global power,
with its corporate and commercial interests present almost everywhere in
the world, with hundreds of thousands of its citizens visiting dozens of
countries, and with its domestic economic interests easily affected by
decisions and activities taken elsewhere, it is no wonder that Congress has
given extraterritorial effect to much civil and penal legislation. This article
has surveyed some of the resulting legal issues.
United States courts have addressed adequately the problems associated
with the prisoner exchange treaties and search and seizure on the high seas.
With respect to criminal statutes which apply extraterritorially, to the
extent that the reach of such statutes is based on the nationality of either
the offender or a human victim, there probably is no major cause for
concern even though another nation can maintain a prosecution in the
same matter based on the territorial principle. That is probably true as well
of instances in which United States criminal legislation rests on the pro-
tected interest principle and activity of nationals of another country direct-
ly affects a matter of dear United States concern, for example,
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counterfeiting its currency, forging its securities or evidences of obligation,
or submitting fraudulent claims at its embassies or consulates.
In some difficult cases, the law of extradition acts to regulate the exercise
of jurisdiction. The situs nation under traditional principles of internation-
al law may decline to extradite for offenses committed wholly outside the
requesting nation's territory, 290 and may refuse to surrender its own na-
tionals unless by extradition treaty it has agreed to do so. 291 The principle
of non his in idem is also a basis to deny extradition, 292 as is the fact of a
pending prosecution not yet final so as to support the non his in idem con-
cept. 293 Conflicting claims of this nature can be resolved through adminis-
tration of extradition machinery if a treaty exists. If not, the first nation
to apprehend a defendant may proceed to judgment and the other can put
its criminal justice machinery into play when and if that offender strays
into its power.
The propriety of the exercise of claimed extraterritorial legislative pow-
ers becomes increasingly doubtful as a nation moves away from traditional
crimes directly affecting governmental activities or officials. Most countries
include some such coverage in their penal laws. 294 But the United States
is significantly more active than other nations in its efforts to extend its
economic regulatory legislation to activities lawful where done, often to
the economic benefit of the situs nation. Federal grand juries and regulato-
ry agencies all too often have asserted leverage over independent subsidi-
aries or trading partner entities within the United States to try to reach
documents relating to exclusively off-shore transactions and entities; an
outcome may be criminal indictments against foreign corporations, firms
and banks which engage in few if any economic transactions within United
States territory. It is no wonder that foreign nations like the United King-
dom 295 react strongly to legislative and judicial imperialism of this sort
and are not content to rely on the reasonable exercise of federal judicial
discretion 296 to avoid inappropriate intervention in their economic affairs.
The American Bar Association has urged the Congress to restrict the scope
of extraterritorial Federal Criminal Code coverage of economic matters, 297
and one may hope in the interests of amicable international relations that
Congress will see fit to adopt such a position.
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See generally Clark, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Merchant Vessels Engaged in International Trade, 11 J. MAR.
L. & Comm. 219 (1980).
2 8
.5ee, e.g., United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 999 (1972).
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29 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (1976). Waters constituting the international boundary with Canada
are covered in id. § 7(2).
30 Id. § 7(5).
31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (passim).
32 Nevertheless, special provision is made for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over
lands reserved or acquired for the use and under either concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, and over any other place obtained for federal use with the concurrence
of a state. 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1976). The first is comprehensive enough to cover places outside
the United States proper, e.g., the Ryukyu Islands before their reversion to Japan. Rose v.
McNamara, 375 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see generally George, The United States in the Ryuiyus:
The Insular Cases Revived, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 794-800 (1964). It also includes United States
diplomatic stations in other countries. United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.) cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973). Conversely, foreign consular facilities within United States territo-
ry may be considered foreign soil, although Congress can penalize crimes of violence commit-
ted there against consular officials. United States v. Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1358 (D.P.R. 1978).
The second covers places like national forests and parks, military and naval facilities, and
lands acquired for other federal governmental uses. United States v. County of Fresno, 429
U.S. 452, 455 (1977). Unless federal jurisdictional powers were reserved when statehood was
granted, a state by statute must cede exclusive control over an area, either by retaining
concurrent powers or relinquishing all authority. The United States must accept such a
cession; whether that has occurred is for federal, not state, courts to determine. DeKalb
County, Georgia v. Henry C. Beck Co., 382 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967).
33 The principal holding to this effect is United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)
(Native American tribal courts represent a separate sovereign and not the federal government,
so that a tribal member may be prosecuted on the same matter before both a tribal court and
United States district court without violating the double jeopardy clause, U.S. Const. amend.
V).
34 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
35 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557-67 (1981).
36 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1976); cf. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
37 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1976); cf. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 493 n.40 (1979).
38 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-53 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224,1230-31 (9th Cir.
1980).
39 United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 647-54 (1978).
40 Compare the drive toward legal modernization in Japan during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century as a basis for renegotiating treaties giving western nations and their
citizens' extraterritorial status in Japan. Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in
PouncA DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN 387, 431 (R. Ward ed. 1968).
41 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1311-15 (1976); United States v. Califor-
nia, 382 U.S. 139,145-51 (1964); cf. People v. Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d 654, 607 P.2d 1279, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 255 (1980) (state's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in absence of federal law).
42 E.g., Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).
43 Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70-75 (1978).
44 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138 (1977). See text accompanying
note 32 supra.
4 5 See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463 (1979).
46 United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980).
47 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
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48 United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981);
United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635-37 (D.P.R. 1978).
49 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
50 See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
51 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Fernandez, 496
F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974).
52 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619-20 (1927).
53 See United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399,402-03 (7th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
54 See United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994
(1981); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
55 United States v. Hayes, 479 F. Supp. 901, 909-12 (D.P.R. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 8 (1st
Cir. 1981).
56 United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001-05 (5th Cir. 1977).
57 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
58 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
59 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957).
60 Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
61 See generally REsTATmE NT REVISED DRaFr No. 3, supra note 4, § 721, Reporters' Note 10;
Feinberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 72 J. CR.L. & CR. 385,
394-95 (Summer 1981); Note, Subjection of American Military Personnel to Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction:
The Territorial Imperative, 58 IowA L. REv. 532 (1973).
6 2 See United States v. Zemater, 501 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cotten, 471
F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973) (American citizens in Vietnam and Japan
who defrauded federal government).
63 United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979); REsTATEmENT REVISED
DRAFr No. 3, supra note 4, § 721, comment h; § 722, Reporters' Note 16; RESTATEMENT REVISED
DRAFr No. 2, supra note 1, § 442, Reporters' Notes 4, 5.
64 Williams v. Froehlke, 490 F.2d 998, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1973).
65 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1957).
66 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972).
67 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
68 See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Niedecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
69 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
70 Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909); State v. Alexander, 222 Ark. 376, 259 S.W.2d
677 (1953).
71 E.g., People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709,256 P.2d 317 (1953); People v. Duffield, 387 Mich.
300, 197 N.W.2d 25 (1972); State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978).
72 People v. Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d 654, 607 P.2d 1279, 163 Cal. Rptr. 255, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 839 (1980).
73 E.g., State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 388 A.2d 190, 195-97 (1978); People
v. Fea, 47 N.Y.2d 70, 390 N.E.2d 286, 416 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1979).
74 State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Minn. 1978). See generally Blume, The Place
of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1944); George, supra
note 2, at 630-31.
75 See note 16 supra.
76 See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
77 Wildenhus's Case (Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail), 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887). See also
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United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1933); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249,
260 (1893); RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFr No. 3, supra note 4, § 512, Reporters' Note 5.
78 See, e.g., 2 HACKWORTH, DIG s-T oF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-88, 208-23 (1941).
79 See infra text accompanying notes 155-82.
80 E.g., Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Com'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472,478-81 (1972);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Field), 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976);
In re Quinn, 525 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1975).
81 But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Flanagan, - F. Supp. -, 30 CRim. L. RnTR. (BNA)
2471 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 10, 1982). The court there found a grand jury witness, a member of the
Irish Republican Army, had a reasonable fear that his testimony might be used against him
in both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Eire, and therefore could refuse to testify.
Grand jury secrecy requirements of Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 6(e) could not guarantee that foreign
governments would not acquire the information, and use immunity conferred under federal
statute cannot bar use of compelled evidence by courts of other countries.
Flanagan was distinguished, but criticized, in Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck,
- N.W.2d -, 31 CRIM. L. RPm. (BNA) 2030 (N.D. Sup. Ct., March 22, 1982). There,
witnesses before a federal grand jury investigating arsons in North Dakota and Canada were
given use immunity and testified without claiming privilege concerning Canadian criminality.
During discovery proceedings in connection with a state civil action brought by an insurance
carrier claiming insurance fraud, two of the civil defendants (former grand jury witnesses)
claimed privilege against incrimination in Canada. The North Dakota Supreme Court disal-
lowed the claim of privilege because they had received the benefit of use immunity in the
federal proceeding and should not be allowed later to renege on the arrangement. Although
the court questioned the legal and functional wisdom of allowing claims of privilege against
incrimination based on foreign law because of the potentially crippling effect it would have
on federal and state immunity legislation, the court allowed a third civil defendant who had
not been a federal grand jury witness to claim privilege on the premise that no nonimmunized
witness need disclose whether a claim of privilege is based on foreign or local law.
82 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3; art. II, § 2, c. 2. See also REsTATEMENT oF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) § 131(3) (Trent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
83 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-74 (1941).
84 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). See generally RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFr
No. 3, supra note 4, § 722.
85 See supra text accompanying note 32.
86 Particularly under U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9.
87 Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322 (1977); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431
U.S. 265 (1977); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941).
88 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
Some states take a contrary view under their own constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Cooper,
398 Mich. 450, 247 N.W.2d 866 (1976).
89 Illustrations include infliction of mortal injuries in one state followed by death in
another, Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1980); People v. Duffield, 387 Mich. 300, 197
N.W.2d 25 (1972); transportation of stolen property from one state to another, Newlon v.
Bennett, 253 Iowa 555, 112 N.W.2d 884, appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 658 (1962); Younie v. State,
281 A.2d 446 (Me. 1971); and a conspiracy conducted across state lines. People v. Perry, 23
Ill. 2d 147,177 N.E.2d 323, 327-28 (1961); State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334,
349 (1964).
90 See, e.g., State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1979).
91 Id.; State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 388 A.2d 190, 195-96 (1978).
92 Compare limitations on use of long-arm statutes in, e.g., products liability cases. Rush
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v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980); RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 453, Reporters' Note 4.
93 Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
95 See, e.g., State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1979).
96 Cf. State v. Jones, 166 Conn. 620, 353 A.2d 764 (1974) (subject-matter jurisdiction is
a matter of law and can neither be waived nor conferred through consent of a defendant);
State v. Yoes, 271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E.2d 386 (1967) (trial of a case over which a court lacks
jurisdictional powers cannot result in a valid determination of guilt and a criminal judgment
so entered is void and must be vacated irrespective of the sufficiency of the evidence submit-
ted at trial to establish violation of the statute); State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1980)
(the rule that a court may hear only those cases arising within its territorial jurisdiction is
a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction).
97 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (irregular interstate return); Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436 (1886) (irregular international return); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701,706 (1st Cir. 1980);
State v. Olinghouse, 605 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. 1980). See generally RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT
No. 3, supra note 4, § 432(1)(b); § 432, Reporter's Note 2: § 433(2), comment b; Evans,
Acquisition of Custody Over the International Fugitive Offender-Alternatives to Extradition; A Survey of
United States Practice, 40 BRiT. Y.B. INTL L. 77 (1964); Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction
Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 Micii. L. REv. 1087,
1103-12 (1974).
The Second Circuit expressed restiveness over the Ker doctrine in United States v. Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), on the basis that "abusive conduct, if it had actually
occurred, could not be tolerated without debasing the processes of justice [if] the actions
against [a returned defendant] were taken by or at the direction of United States officials."
United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1981) (summarizing the Toscanino holding).
The court, however, has not in fact invoked its doctrine to benefit prisoners because in the
cases before it no "acts of torture, terror, or custodial interrogation" were established, United
States v. Reed, 639 F.2d at 901 (summarizing United States er rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d
62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)), the activities of United States agents were
reasonable under the circumstances, United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d at 901-02, or no United
States representatives in fact participated in the law enforcement activities complained of.
United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
The Toscanino rule is adopted in Restatement Revised Draft No. 3, supra note 4, § 433(3), comment
c; Reporters' Note 3.
98 E.g., Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 1979, United States-Turkey, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
9892; Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 1979, United States-Peru, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9784;
Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 1979, United States-Panama, - , U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 9787;
Prisoner Transfer Treaty, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 6263, T.I.A.S. No.
9552; Prisoner Transfer Treaty, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, 30 U.S.T. 796, T.I.A.S.
No. 9219; Prisoner Transfer Treaty, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, 28 U.S.T. 7399,
T.I.A.S. No. 8718.
99 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.); RESTATEMENT REVISED
DRAFT No. 2, supra 1, § 442(1).
100 In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) (irnate of Iowa prison, convicted by federal court
in Indian Territory, released on habeas corpus).
101 See note 98 supra.
102 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3244, 4100-4115 (Supp. 1981).
103 Some prisoners have been transferred from the United States to countries of their
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nationality, but in describing the current constitutional litigation the procedures affecting
United States nationals are most germane.
104 Treaties may provide for transfer of juveniles adjudicated for what would have been
an act of juvenile delinquency if committed in the United States or any state. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 4110 (Supp. 1981). Parental consent or approval by a court is required before a juvenile
prisoner's consent is operative under the treaty system, id. § 4100(b), but after transfer federal
law for the treatment of juvenile delinquents governs. Id. § 4110.
105 Id. §§ 3244(1), 4108(b)(1).
106 Id. § 4108(a). Indigent prisoners have a right to counsel at federal government expense
in the country of imprisonment. Id. § 4109. Similar hearings are provided for prisoners to be
transferred from the United States. Id. § 4107; Tavarez v. U.S. Attorney General, - F.2d
-, 30 CRM. L. RPR. (BNA) 2492 (5th Cir., Feb. 22, 1982).
107 18 U.S.C.A. § 3244(5) (Supp. 1981).
108 Id. § 4104. Paroled prisoners may be received without the need for advance judicial
consent. Id. § 4106(a)-(b).
109 Id. § 4105(b). Prisoners also must receive the benefit of a pardon, commutation,
amnesty or any other ameliorating modification or revocation of sentence by the country in
which it was entered. Id. § 4100(d).
110 Id. § 4105(c).
111 Id. § 4106(c).
112 Id. § 4111.
113 Id. § 4112.
114 Id. § 4115.
115 Id. § 4114. A Mexican citizen transferred to Mexican custody under a prisoner ex-
change treaty, who escaped, returned to the United States and was apprehended, could be
restored to Mexican custody pursuant to id. § 4107(b)(3) without following international
extradition procedures. However, the prisoner had the right to counsel and to a habeas corpus
hearing to dispute identity or the fact of escape, but not the validity of the Mexican penal
judgment. Tavarez, v. U.S. Attorney General, - F.2d -, 30 CRim. L. Rpr. (BNA) 2492 (5th
Cir., Feb. 22, 1982).
116 See generally Note, Constitutional Problems in the Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-
American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 H~Av. L. REV. 1500 (1977).
117 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980).
118 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
119 E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459 (1969).
120 E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973). Compare the standards imposed by the Supreme Court for waiver of rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
121 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
122 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
123 Cf. FED. R. CRms. P. 11.
124 The Rosado court used the analogy of extradition under treaty. 621 F.2d at 1192-93.
See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
125 "[W]e by no means condone the shockingly brutal treatment to which [petitioners]
fell prey. Rather, we hold open the door for others similarly victimized to escape their
torment." Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1200-01.
126 Pfeifer relied on United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), which had invalidated
a system in which defendants who pleaded guilty could not receive a capital sentence, but
those who went to trial and were convicted might. This was viewed as an unconstitutional
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burden on the sixth amendment right to jury trial.Jackson does not apply beyond capital cases,
however. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
127 The court used the analogy of the pardon cases, which recognize the validity of
conditions placed on those who accept pardons. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
128 Pfeifer, 615 F.2d at 877. See United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978) (United
States Drug Enforcement Administration agents participated in interrogation sessions con-
ducted by Mexican officers; failure to give Miranda warnings invalidated the resulting confes-
sions); cf. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960
(1969) (evidence obtained by Philippine officers in violation of Philippine constitution and
laws was not inadmissible in an American federal proceeding even though the Philippine
officers may originally have acted because of information or requests submitted by American
officials). See also RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAF No. 3, supra note 4, §§ 432(1), 433(2), (4).
129 See generally Note, Drug Smuggling and the Protective Principle: A Journey Into Uncharted Waters,
39 LA. L. REv. 1189 (1979).
130 See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 788 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967
(1980) (government claim that docked craft had contacted hovering mother ship not substan-
tiated on record).
131 International law long has recognized several bases for peacetime interception of
merchant ships on the high seas. See generally Clark, Criminal jurisdiction Over Merchant Vessels
Engaged in International Trade, 11 J. MAR. L. & COmm. 219, 227-30, 234-36 (1980). In addition,
as nations endeavor to extend their territorial waters ever further away from their shores to
exploit natural resources, see generally RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, §§
511-517; Note, jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles: A Persistent Problem, 10 CAL. WSrERN Iv"L L.J. 514
(1980), a basis for asserting criminal jurisdiction is likely to follow, even though seldom
exercised.
132 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 (1976).
133 See generally RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 513, Reporters' Note 4;
Ficken, The 1935 Anti-Sm uggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcotics Smugglers Beyond the Contiguous Zone:
An Assessment Under International Law, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 700, 703-11 (1975).
134 See Ficken, supra note 133, at 710-11.
135 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976).
136 Defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1976).
137 Id. § 1581(a).
138 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 11; RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 522(2). Coast Guard vessels
come within the definition of warship under the treaty, and can rely on its provisions even
though the treaty is not viewed otherwise as self-executing. United States v. Williams, 617
F.2d 1063,1082 (5th Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFr No. 3, supra note 4, § 522, comment
a. Art. 23 of the Convention incorporates a doctrine of hot pursuit which can justify activities
extending beyond territorial waters. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 513, comment
h.
139 See RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFr No. 3, § 522(2)-(3).
140 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 138, art. 6(1); RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No.
3, supra note 4, 522(2)(c).
141 See generally RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 433, Reporters' Note 4;
Carmichael, AtSea With the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51 (1977); Saltzburg, The Reach
of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741 (1980); Note,
High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 725 (1980).
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142 United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1068 (5th Cir. 1978) (under 14 U.S.C. § 89(c)
(1976)), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
143 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 870-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
144 United States v. Ruano, 647 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); United States v. Guillen-
Linares, 643 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1981) (inland waters); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). The standard of reasonableness for search is that
which the Supreme Court used in evaluating searches of first-class mail received from other
countries in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); see also United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1980).
145 United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1981) (drifting vessel observed fifty
miles off Cape Cod, with no cargo visible; radio checks with DEA produced information that
the same vessel under different names had been involved in narcotics smuggling; Coast Guard
vessel fired shot across bow and boarded; officer smelled marijuana in hold and discovered
a large quantity of it; court sustained stop and boarding on the analogy of fourth amendment
stop-and-frisk decisions, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)).
146 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
147 See also RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 522(3).
148 Boarding officials may check a vessel's topside to see if all persons on board are
accounted for properly, without needing to establish reasonable suspicion beforehand. The
plain view doctrine applies when incriminating evidence is turned up in the process. United
States v. Alfrey, 612 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1980).
149 See also RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 522(2)-(3).
150 288 U.S. 102 (1933). See also Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Ficken, supra
note 133, at 724-25.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
152 See RESTATEMENT REVISED DArTr No. 3, supra note 4, § 703, comment c; Reporters' Note
5.
153 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980).
154 A similar position has been taken based on art. 6 of the high seas convention in United
States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1982).
155 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). See generally PERsPEcTIvEs ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
oF U.S. ANrrrmusT AND OaER LAWS 7-75 (J. Griffin ed. 1979); Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos'"
Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. REv.
733 (1977); Trebec, supra note 12.
156 Much of the controversy over extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act has stemmed
from civil, including treble damage, actions. Nevertheless, at times the juridical act precipitat-
ing intergovernmental disputes has been a grand jury subpoena duces tecum or other process
issued in connection with a federal grand jury inquiry into possible criminal violations of the
antitrust laws. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT REIvSED DRAIr No. 3, supra note 4, § 420; 2 J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusnESS ABROAD ch. 15 (2d ed. 1981); Lowe, Blocking
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257,
271-72 (1981); Onkelinx, Conflict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in
Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 487, 503-06, 507-09, 518-19 (1969). Grand jury
investigations naturally presuppose valid legislative and adjudicative competence. Because
the federal statute draws no distinctions between its civil and criminal coverage or applica-
tion, the civil jurisdiction cases should govern criminal prosecutions as well until the federal
judiciary decides to the contrary.
157 This, according to British analysis, is the maximum scope for penal jurisdiction under
international law principles. See Lowe, supra note 156, at 164.
158 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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159 See RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 415, Reporters' Note 3; Ongman,
supra note 155, at 739-41.
160 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979).
161 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation (Westinghouse Electric Corp.), 617 F.2d 1248,
1254-55 (7th Cir. 1980); Lowe, supra note 156, at 262-67. Australian law seems to lie closer
to United States than to British doctrine. See Taylor, The Extraterritoriality of the Australian Antitrust
Law, 13 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 273, 310 (1979).
162 Timberlane Lbr. Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
163 549 F.2d at 613. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation (Westinghouse Electric
Corp.), 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
164 Timberlane Lbr. Co., 549 F.2d at 614; see also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
165 See Lowe, supra note 156, at 268-69.
166 But see Brett, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws Seen as Diminishing, N.Y.L.J.,
Monday, Oct. 5, 1981, at 4.
167 1980, c. 11 (in force from March 20, 1980). See generally Lowe, supra note 156, at 272-80.
168 Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11, § 1(2).
169 Id. § 1(3). Exercise of such powers is not subject to judicial review. Lowe, supra note
156, at 273 n.84.
1 70 See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,1292-94 (3d Cir. 1979);
RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 419(1); Reporters' Notes 1, 4-5.
171 Protection of Trading Interest Act 1980, c. 11, § 3(2).
172 Id. § 2(3). The act, id. § 5, prohibits British courts from enforcing multiple damages
or "competition" judgments awarded by foreign courts, even though competent under for-
eign law to render them. It also allows British subjects or firms or persons carrying on
businesses in the U.K. to "clawback" or recover multiple damages enforced against them in
another nation unless, at the time the litigation commenced, an otherwise qualifying civil
defendant was ordinarily resident or ordinarily conducted business in the nation in which
the original award was given, and the activities giving rise to that award occurred exclusively
in that nation. Id. § 6(2), (3). See generally Lowe, supra note 156, at 276-80.
173 See Onkelinx, supra note 156, at 507-08; RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFr No. 3, supra note
4, § 420, Reporters' Note 3.
174 See infra text accompanying notes 274-77. Federal criminal code proposals also preserve
the doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 237-39, 260-63.
175 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
176 Id. § 78j. Criminal penalties are fixed in id. § 77x.
177 Id. § 78dd(b).
178 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on rehearing, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906
(1969). See also lIt v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549
F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972). See generally Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws to International Securities Transac-
tions, 45 ALB. L. REv. 890, 891 n.6 (1981) (citing comprehensively earlier literature); Mizrack,
Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 30 Bus. LAw. 367 (1975).
179 See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836
(1978) ("That Congress would allow America to be a haven for swindlers and confidence men
when the victims are European while expecting the highest level of business practice when
the investors are American is 'simply unimaginable,"' quoting ITT v. Vencapp Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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180 Interstate commerce, transportation or communications or the mails must be used
directly or indirectly in effectuating a scheme.
181 See Johnson, supra note 178, at 931. See also S.E.C. v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113-14 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba), Ltd. v. S.E.C., 431 U.S. 938
(1977).
182 See supra text accompanying notes 167-74. The provisions of the United Kingdom
Protection of Trading Interests Act, supra note 167, are comprehensive enough to affect grand
jury investigations of securities violations.
183 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516.
184 NAT'L COMM N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS FINAL REPORT: PROPOSED NEw
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971), reprinted in Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
133-514 (1971) (commonly known as the Brown Commission Report after its chairperson, former
Governor Edmund F. Brown of California) [hereinafter cited as Brown Commission Report].
185 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter
cited as S. 1437]; S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
186 S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as S. 1630]; H.R. 4711, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 4711]. See generally Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981 Report to Accompany S. 1630, S. Rep. No. 307,97th Cong.,
1st Sess. ch. 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. 1630 Report]. Unfortunately, Senate inaction
seems to spell the demise of a federal criminal code revision for the current session of
Congress. See American Bar Ass'n, 18 Washington Letter (No. 5) 1 (1982).
187 See Brown Commission Report, supra note 184, § 201. Special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction is defined id. § 210. See generally I Nat'l Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Working Papers 33-67 (1970).
188 Brown Commission Report, supra note 184, §§ 201(e)-(i), 208, 212, 219. See generally I Natl
Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 69-76 (1970).
189 See Senate Committee on the judiciary Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 Report to Accompany S.
1722, S. Rep. No. 553,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980) [hereinafter cited as S. 1722 Report ];Senate
Committee on the judiciary, Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 Report to Accompany S. 1437, S. Rep. No.
605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1437Report ].
190See, e.g., the homicide provisions of S. 1630,supra note 186, §§ I601(e), 1602(c), 1603(c);
H.R. 4711, supra note 186, §§ 2301(d)-(e), 2302(d).
191 S. 1437, supra note 185, § 211, creating a new FEo. R. CRIM, P. 25.1(b)(1) to that effect;
see also S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 44-45; S. 1437 Report, supra note 189, at 40.
192 Compare S. 1630, supra note 186, § 201(c) (existence of federal jurisdiction is not an
element of an offense), with H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 116(a) ("the finder of fact shall
determine issues of fact bearing on the existence of Federal jurisdiction over an offense"). See
also House Committee on the judiciary, Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980 Report Together with Additional
Separate, Supplemental, and Dissenting Views to Accompany H.R. 6915, H.R. Rep. No. 1396, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 116, at 27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 6915 Report].
193 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 202; H.R. 4711 supra note 186, § 112. "United States" in a
geographic sense is defined to include all states, all places subject to the special territorial
jurisdiction of the United States defined and discussed below, text accompanying notes
195-203, all waters subject to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States,
and the airspace overlying states, places and waters. S. 1630, § 111; 5. 1630 Report, supra note
186, at 45. H.R. 4711 does not contain a counterpart definitional provision, but the same
meaning is intended. See H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 23.
194 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203, first paragraph; H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(a).
195 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(a)(1); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(b)(1). Both are
intended to continue the provisions of present 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1976), based in turn on U.S.
JURISDICTION 37
CONsr. art. I, § 8, d. 17. See S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 45-46; S. 1722 Report, supra note
189, at 41; H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 23-24. See also supra text accompanying note 32.
196 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(a)(2); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(b)(2). This is
derived from U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 46; S. 1722 Report,
supra note 189, at 41; H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 24.
197 H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(a)(3) continues the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 7(4) (1976),
restricted to guano islands, etc., under 48 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976), but S. 1630, supra note 186,
§ 203(a)(4) removes that restriction and requires only that the President designate an island,
rock or key as appertaining to the United States. See S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 49; S.
1722 Report, supra note 189, at 44-45.
198 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(a)(5); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(b)(4), both
cross-referring to 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). See S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 49; S. 1722
Report, supra note 189, at 45.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
200 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 152, amending 25 U.S.C., at 336-38.
201 Id. § 203(a)(3).
202 H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 114. This continues the approach in the present federal
law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976).
20 3 See generally S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 46-49; S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 42-44;
H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 25-26. This relates to the present Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). For the basic interpretation of that legislation, see Keeble v. United
States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973).
204 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (1976). See text accompanying notes 26-39 supra; S. 1630 Report, supra
note 186, at 49-50; S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 45; H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 24.
205 The Senate coverage is of the high seas or any other waters within the admirality and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and outside any state's jurisdiction. S. 1630, supra
note 186, § 203(b)(1)-(2). The House version specifies "the high seas" (which consists of those
parts of the sea that are not included, in accordance with international law, in the territorial
sea or the internal waters of a nation), H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(c)(1), as well as any
waters other than high seas within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States but lying outside the jurisdiction of any state. 1d. § 113(c)(2). Vessels registered,
licensed or enrolled under United States law are covered when they are navigating the Great
Lakes or the Saint Lawrence River where it constitutes the international boundary line with
Canada. S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(b)(4); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(c)(4) (both
continuing the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 7(2) (1976).
206 This is a slight expansion on the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (1976). See S. 1630 Report,
supra note 186, at 50; S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 46; H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at
24.
207 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(b)(3); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(c)(3).
208 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) and 49 U.S.C. § 1301(38) (1976).
209 Aircraft are in flight from the moment when all external doors are closed following
embarkation until the time any door is opened for disembarkation or, if there is a forced
landing, until a competent authority assumes responsibility for the aircraft and persons and
property aboard it. S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(c) (final paragraph); H.R. 4711(d), supra note
186, § 113(d) (final paragraph). This language is derived from the Convention for Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, art. 2(a),
24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (entered into force for the U.S, Jan. 26,1973), and Convention
for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16,1970, art. 3(1), 22 U.S.T.
1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (entered into force for the U.S. Oct. 14, 1971). The above definition
is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(34) (1976) (final paragraph).
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210 See generally S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 50-51; S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 46;
H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 24-25.
211 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(c)(1); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(d)(1). See 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301(14) (civil aircraft is "other than a public aircraft"), (32) (definition of "public air-
craft") (1976).
212 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(c)(2); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(d)(2). The
cross-reference for the definition of "civil aircraft of the United States" is 49 U.S.C. § 1301(18)
(1976).
213 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(c)(3); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(d)(3). Both are
intended to bring forward language in 49 U.S.C. § 1301(34)(c) (1976). See S. 1630 Report, supra
note 186, at 50; S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 46; H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 24.
214 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), supra
note 209, art. 1, defines the crime as unlawfully seizing or exercising control over an aircraft
by force, threat of force or any other form of intimidation, and includes accomplices to one
who commits such acts. Each contracting state undertakes to punish such conduct severely,
id. art. 2, and to include it as an extraditable offense in an existing or future treaty, id. art.
8, or to prosecute the matter in its own courts. Id. art. 7.
215 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(c)(4); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(d)(4). These
sections are derived from 49 U.S.C. § 1301(38)(d) (1976).
216 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 203(c)(5); H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 113(d)(4). These restate
49 U.S.C. § 1301(38)(e) (1976).
217 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 204. See generally S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 51-55; S.
1722 Report, supra note 189, at 47-50; Feinberg, supra note 61, at 392-96.
218 See supra text accompanying note 193.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 194-216.
220 Defined in S. 1630, supra note 186, § 111.
221 Defined id.
222 Defined id.
223 Id. § 204(a).
224 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 52, and S.
1722 Report, supra note 189, at 47 suggest these rest on the protected interest principle, dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
225 See supra text accompanying note 32.
226 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 204(b)-(d).
227 Defined id. § 1101.
228 Defined id. § 1111.
229 The list appears id. § 204(c).
230 Id. § 204(d) cross-refers to offenses defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1976).
231 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14
232 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
233 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 204(e).
234 Id. § 204(f).
235 See supra text accompanying notes 195-203. S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 53 n.96,
and S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 48 n.92 cite United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 876 (1973), as establishing the principle.
236 See S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 51; S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 48.
237 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 204(g).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 161-66. S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 51, and S.
1722 Report, supra note 189, at 48 indicate that this requirement is intended to be incorporated,
but there is nothing in S. 1630 language so providing.
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240 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 204(h). The specific definitions of activity in §§ 1001-1004
are probably adequate to control too sweeping an invocation of the provision for external
application.
241 Id. § 204(i).
242 "Public servant" is defined id. § 111.
243 Id. § 204(i).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
245 See S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 53-54; 5. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 49-50.
246 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 2040).
247 See S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 55; S. 1722 Report, supra note 189, at 50.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
249 S. 1630, supra note 186, § 204(k). See generally S. 1630 Report, supra note 186, at 55; 5. 1722
Report, supra note 189, at 50.
250 Supra note 23, arts. 3, 7.
251 Supra note 23, arts. 1, 5, 8(d).
252 See supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
253 See, e.g., H.R. 4711, supra note 186, §§ 1732(c) (failing to appear as a witness in a federal
official proceeding); 1733(c) (refusing to produce information for a federal official proceeding);
1734(d) (refusing to testify at a federal official proceeding); 1735(c) (disobeying a federal court
order); 1741(c) (perjury in the context of a federal official proceeding); 1742(e) (making a false
statement if the government is the United States, the government is a state, local or foreign
government, and the false claim is of United States citizenship; or enumerated national credit
and small business investment institutions are affected); 1743(c) (tampering with a federal
government record); 1744(b)(2) (false emergency report by United States national to a federal
organization or government agency as defined); 1751(c)(2) (bribery of federal public servant);
1752(c)(2) (graft involving federal public servant); 1754(d)(2) (trading in special influence
affecting federal public servant); 1755(b) (trading in public office affecting federal public
servant); 1756(b) (speculating on official action or information by federal public servant or
affecting federal government agency); 1757(d) (tampering with a federal public servant);
1758(b) (retaliating against a federal public servant); 2301(d)(2) (murder if the victim is the
President, President-elect, Vice-President, Vice-President-elect, acting President by law,
Senator, Representative, Senator or Representative-elect, delegate or resident commissioner
to Congress, or a federally protected foreign individual); 2311(c)(2) (maiming of same classes
of victims enumerated for murder); 2315(c)(2) (terrorizing federally protected foreign in-
dividual); 2321(c)(2) (kidnapping in the special jurisdiction of the United States or affecting
the same classes of victims enumerated for murder); 2501(d) (arson of property owned by or
under the care, custody or control of the United States, or being produced, manufactured,
constructed or stored under contract for the United States); 2502(e) (aggravated property
destruction of the same categories of property as in arson); 2521(c)(2) (robbery of federally
protected foreign individual); 2522(c) (extortion against federally protected foreign individu-
al); 2538(b) (commandeering a United States registry vessel); 2541(d) (counterfeiting written
instruments made or issued by or under the authority of or guaranteed by the United States);
2542(d) (forgery of same); 2543(d) (traffic in counterfeiting or forging implements within the
special jurisdiction of the United States).
Customs offenses are based in part on a concept of "introduce" embracing transactions
beginning anywhere outside the United States. Id. § 1914(2).
These incorporate collectively all the traditional bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction
except, perhaps, for the universality principle. See H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 21.
254 Although the disjunctive "or" is not included, the intent is to make them independent
alternatives. See H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 21-23.
255 H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 111(c)(1).
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256 See supra text accompanying notes 246-48.
257 H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 111(c)(2). See H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 22 (using
as an illustration ice floes in Antarctica).
258 See supra text accompanying notes 241-45.
259 H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 111(c)(3). See H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 22.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
261 H.R. 4711, supra note 186, § 111(c)(4).
262 Id. (final paragraph). See H.R. 6915 Report, supra note 192, at 23-24, indicating a legisla-
tive purpose to retain existing federal judicial doctrine, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 155-66, 175-82.
263 See supra text accompanying notes 167-74.
264 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4; RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra
note 1.
265 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 401; RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFt No.
2, supra note 1, §§ 402-18.
266 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 401(2); RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT
No. 2, supra note 1, §§ 441-43.
267 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFt No. 3, supra note 4, § 401(3).
268 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 402(1)(a).
269 Id. § 402(1)(b).
270 Id. § 402(1)(c).
271 Id. § 402(2).
272 Id. 402(3). This is to be clarified to indicate that the protective principle is all that is
meant. 4 ALI Reporter, No. 1, p. 8 (Oct. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 ALl Reporter].
273 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 404.
274 The reporters agreed to consider substitution for the term "unreasonable" of an
alternative like "extravagant" or "exorbitant." 1981 ALl Reporter, supra note 272, at 8.
275 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAF No. 2, supra note 1, § 403(1). The language will be clarified
to indicate whether a connection is enough to precipitate applicability of the limitation, or
whether there actually must be a clear jurisdictional conflict. 1981 ALlReporter, supra note 272,
at 8.
276 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 403(2). The factors include: (a) the
extent to which activity takes place within or has substantial, direct and foreseeable effect
upon or in a regulating state; (b) links like nationality, residence or economic activity between
the regulating state and persons principally responsible for the activity, or between it and
those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the regulated
activity, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other nations
regulate such activities, and the extent to which such a regulation is generally accepted as
desirable; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by a
regulation; (e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic
system; (f) the extent to which regulation is consistent with international tradition; (g) the
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the
likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states. Even if none of these criteria is directly
affected, a law or regulation can be unreasonable if it requires persons or entities to violate
another state's norms not unreasonable under those same criteria. In such an instance the
respective interests of the regulating nations should be evaluated under the same criteria in
respect of one another. Id. § 403(3). Even if Congress exceeds international law bounds in a
clear purpose to assert jurisdiction, its product if otherwise constitutional is effective as law
within the United States. Id. § 403(4)(b).
277 Id. § 415. The reporters are to revise this section to show applicability of the principle
of reasonableness throughout, to suggest some circumstances which are prima facie reason-
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able, to create greater flexibility in the categories and make them less rigid, and to make clear
applicability of the Clayton Act. 1981 ALI Reporter, supra note 272, at 8.
278 The reporters are to consider deleting this alternative. 1981 ALIReporter, supra note 272,
at 8.
279 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFr No. 2, supra note 1, § 416(1).
280 The effects principle rather than the passive persoriality principle is intended here.
1981 ALI Reporter, supra note 272, at 8.
281 RESTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 416(2). There is also special coverage
of tax jurisdiction, id. §§ 411-413, and foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations, id.
§ 418, but these have at most only a slight bearing on criminal law matters.
282 Id. § 416(2).
283 Id. § 441(1).
284 Provisions on jurisdiction to enforce are contained in REsTATEMENT REVISED DRAFT No.
3, supra note 4, §§ 431-432.
2 8 5 The alternatives on which jurisdiction to adjudicate may be rested under RESTATEMENT
REVISED DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, are: (a) the person or thing is present within a state's
territory on other than a transitory basis; (b) a natural person is domiciled or (c) resident in
a state's territory; (d) a natural person is a national of the state; (e) a corporation or juridical
person is organized pursuant to the law of the state or one of its subdivisions; (f) a ship,
aircraft or other vehicle to which an adjudication relates is registered under the laws of the
state; (g) a natural or juridical person has consented to exercise of jurisdiction by the state
or a court or administrative tribunal (although this would have no validity in a criminal case
because jurisdiction to adjudicate cannot be conferred through consent; see supra note 96); (h)
a natural or juridical person regularly carried on business within a state or (i) carried on
activity creating liability within a state (but only in respect to that activity); (j) a natural or
juridical person carried on activity outside the state having a "a substantial, direct, or foresee-
able effect within the state" which created liability (but only in respect to that activity); or
(k) a thing is owned, possessed or used in a state, but only with respect to that thing or a
claim reasonably connected with it. Id. § 441(2). Special appearances are allowed to challenge
jurisdiction, but other appearances (in noncriminal matters, at any rate) waive a defense of
lack of jurisdiction. Id. § 441(3).
286 Id. § 442(1). This should have no impact on the resolution of the matter of treaty
authorization for service of foreign judgments of conviction within the correctional system
of a nation of citizenship. See supra text accompanying notes 99-128.
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